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Abstract—We propose a novel image transformation scheme
using generative adversarial networks (GANs) for privacy-
preserving deep neural networks (DNNs). The proposed scheme
enables us not only to apply images without visual information
to DNNs, but also to enhance robustness against ciphertext-only
attacks (COAs) including DNN-based attacks. In this paper, the
proposed transformation scheme is demonstrated to be able to
protect visual information on plain images, and the visually-
protected images are directly applied to DNNs for privacy-
preserving image classification. Since the proposed scheme uti-
lizes GANs, there is no need to manage encryption keys. In
an image classification experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme in terms of classification accuracy and
robustness against COAs.
Index Terms—Deep neural network, generative adversarial
network, privacy-preserving, visual protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become one of the
most powerful approaches for solving complex problems
for many applications [1]–[3], such as for computer vision,
biomedical systems, natural language processing, and speech
recognition. DNNs gain an advantage by using a large amount
of data to extract representations of relevant features, so the
performance is significantly improved [4]. However, DNNs
have been deployed in security-critical applications, such as
facial recognition, biometric authentication, and medical image
analysis.
Instead of using local servers, it is very popular for data
owners to use cloud servers to compute a huge amount of
data, but several data security issues have to be considered
for utilizing DNNs, such as data privacy, data leakage, and
unauthorized data access. Moreover, DNNs can be vulnerable
if adversaries carry out model inversion attacks [5], [6] to
obtain trained data from the trained model. Hence, privacy-
preserving DNNs have become an urgent challenge. In this
paper, we focus on protecting visual information of images
before uploading the images to cloud environments.
Various perceptual image encryption methods have been
proposed to protect visual information of images [7]–[15]. In
contrast to information theory-based encryption (like RSA and
AES), images encrypted by the perceptual encryption methods
can be directly applied to some image processing algorithms.
A few previous works [10], [14], [15] have been proposed
not only to protect the visual information of images but also
to be applicable to DNNs. However, the visual information of
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Fig. 1: Example of encrypted images. (a) Original image
(U ×V = 96× 96). (b) Tanaka’s scheme [10] (c) Pixel-based
encryption [14], [15]. (d) Proposed scheme.
images encrypted by using these methods have been pointed
out to be reconstructed if adversaries carry out DNN-based
attacks [15]–[17].
This paper proposes a novel image transformation scheme
for privacy-preserving DNNs that enables us not only to
apply images without visual information to DNNs, but also to
enhance robustness against COAs. Since the proposed scheme
utilizes the framework of generative adversarial networks
(GANs), there is no need to manage encryption keys. In
an image classification experiment, the proposed scheme is
demonstrated to enable us not only to maintain high classi-
fication accuracy as that of conventional methods but also to
have stronger robustness against COAs including DNN-based
attacks than conventional ones.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Image Encryption for Privacy-Preserving DNNs
Various perceptual image encryption methods have been
proposed to protect visual information of plain images [7]–
[15]. Visually-protected images generated by using an en-
cryption method consist of pixels, as shown in Figs. 1(b) and
1(c). Therefore, the encrypted images can be directly applied
to image processing algorithms. Some of encryption methods
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Fig. 2: The framework of GAN-based attack (GA)
have been studied for applying encrypted images to traditional
machine learning algorithms, such as support vector machine
(SVM), under the use of the kernel trick [18], [19] , but they
cannot be applied to DNNs [15].
There are three encryption methods [10], [14], [15] for
privacy-preserving DNNs. The first method is Tanaka’s
scheme [10], which utilizes an adaptation network prior to
DNNs to reduce the influence of image encryption. The second
[14] is a pixel-based method, which enables data augmentation
in the encrypted domain, under the use of a common encryp-
tion key to every image. The third one [15] enables us to assign
an independent encryption key to every image; therefore, there
is no need to manage keys. However, these methods do not
consider robustness against DNN-based attacks [16]. Hence,
this paper aims to produce visually-protected images having
robustness against various COAs including DNN-based ones,
while maintaining high classification accuracy.
B. Robustness against Ciphertext-only Attacks
In this paper, we focus on robustness against COAs, such
as brute-force attacks and DNN-based attacks. Conventional
encryption methods [10], [14], [15] have large key spaces, so
they are robust against brute-force attacks. However, they are
pointed out not to have enough robustness against DNN-based
attacks [15].
There are two type of DNN-based attacks: unshared weight
attack (UWA) [16] and GAN-based attack (GA) [17]. Al-
though the pixel-based encryption with independent encryption
keys [15] has stronger robustness against UWA than that with
a common key, robustness against GA has not been evaluated
yet. The detail of GA is described in this section.
Figure 2 illustrates the framework of GA which consists
of one generative network and one discriminative network.
The generative network (Gatt(.)) reconstructs visual informa-
tion on plain images from the encrypted images while the
discriminative network (Datt(.)) distinguishes the difference
between reconstructed images and the plain ones. The network
architectures of Datt(.) and Gatt(.) used in this paper are
illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively.
To train GA, a set of training images T is equally divided
into two image sets: T1, and T2, and then T1 is encrypted by
using an encryption scheme (Enc(.)). Eventually, Enc(T1)
and T2 are employed for training Gatt(.) and Datt(.) (See
Fig. 2).
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Overview
Figure 5(a) illustrates the use of a transformation network
(hp(.)) for protecting training and testing images in DNNs. In
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Fig. 3: Discriminative network Datt(.)
order to obtain hp(.), as depicted in Fig. 5(b), the proposed
scheme has two processes: preliminary visual protection and
transformation network training. In the preliminary visual
protection process, a set of preliminary protected images (P)
is generated from a pre-trained model (hθ(.)) by using a set
of training images (X) and the corresponding labels (Y). X
with Y , and P are utilized for training hp(.) which is used for
generating a set of visually-protected images (Xp). Namely,
Xp = hp(X).
Hence, images used for training and testing DNNs are
protected by using hp(.), as shown in Fig. 5(a).
B. Preliminary Visual Protection Process
We aim to generate a protected image (xp) from a plain
image (x) with a label (y) by adding some perceptible noise
∆; therefore, xp = x+∆. Let xi and yi denote i-th image with
a label, where xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y. In contrast to adversarial
examples [20], protected images are generated by minimizing
the loss with respect to input x with ∆ as given by
minimize
∆∈P
1
m
m∑
i=1
L(hθ(xi +∆), yi), (1)
where P is a perturbation set, and L(.) is a loss function.
The perturbation set P , which is used for protecting visual
information on plain images, can be written as
P = {∆ : ‖∆‖
∞
≤ ǫ}, (2)
where ǫ is the magnitude of the perturbation. The proposed
method is inspired by adversarial attacks called projected gra-
dient descent (PGD). We minimize the loss, but the adversarial
attack maximizes it. At the (t + 1)th iteration, the protected
image (xt+1p ) is
xt+1p =
∏
x+∆
(xtp + αsign(∇x(−L(θ, x, y)))), (3)
where α is a step size. In this paper, ∆ is iteratively added to
an image for 50 iterations.
Therefore, hθ(.) is expected to precisely classify the pro-
tected images, although the images have no visual information.
C. Transformation Network
To obtain a transformation network hp(.), we utilize un-
paired image-to-image translation using cycle-consistent ad-
versarial networks (CycleGAN) [21] to convert an image from
the plain domain to the visually-protected domain.
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Fig. 4: Architectures of generative network Gatt(.).
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Fig. 5: Proposed scheme for privacy-preserving DNNs.
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1) Formulation: Let A and B denote the plain domain
and the visually-protected domain, respectively. As shown
in Fig. 6, CycleGAN consists of two generative networks:
GAB : A → B, and GBA : B → A, which transform
an image between two domains. In addition, there are two
discriminative networks FA and FB . FA discriminates the
difference between x andGBA(xp) while FB distinguishes the
difference between xp and GAB(x). The objective of training
CycleGAN is to obtain GAB which transforms plain images
to visually-protected images, namely, hp(.) = GAB .
2) Loss Function: According to [21], the CycleGAN uti-
lizes two loss functions: adversarial loss (Lad), and cycle
consistency loss (Lcyc). Therefore, the full objective function
(Lgan) can be expressed as
Lgan(GAB, GBA, FA, FB) =λLad(GBA, FA, x, xp)
+ λLad(GAB , FB, xp, x)
+ Lcyc(GBA, GAB),
(4)
where λ is utilized for weighting the relation between Lad and
Lcyc.
In order to ensure that images generated by hp(.) have
no visual information while maintaining high classification
accuracy, we propose a new cycle consistency loss which can
be written as
Lcyc = γ1 · Lp + γ2 · Lc + γ3 · Lr, (5)
where Lp, Lc, and Lr denote a perceptual loss, classification
loss, and pixel-wise reconstruction loss, respectively.
We first aim to maximize the perceptual loss (Lp) [22] to
protect the visual information. Since the CycleGAN consists
of two cycles: A → B, and B → A. The perceptual loss of
our CycleGAN, Lp, can be expressed as
Lp = Lfeat(x,GAB(x)) + Lfeat(x,GBA(xp)). (6)
In accordance with [22], the feature loss (Lfeat) is calculated
by
Lfeat(xi, xˆi) =
1
CkHkWk
‖φk(xˆi)− φk(xi)‖
2
2
, (7)
where φk(xi) is a feature map with a size of Ck ×Hk ×Wk,
obtained by using the kth layer of a network when image xi
is fed [22]. Note that xˆi is a transformed image generated by
GAB(.) and GBA(.). In this paper, we use VGG16 [23], which
is pre-trained with ImageNet, as a network for φk(xi). Note
that we utilize the feature maps of the second ReLU fuction
of VGG16.
Moreover, to maintain high classification accuracy, we solve
the minimization problem of the classification loss (Lcls) by
utilizing hθ from Section III-B, where Lcls is given by the
cross entropy loss. The classification loss of the CycleGAN
(Lc) is
Lc = Lcls(hθ(GAB(x), y)) + Lcls(hθ(GBA(xp), y) (8)
As in [21], we also utilize the following reconstruction loss
(Lr).
Lr = ‖GBA(GAB(x))− x‖
2
2
+ ‖GAB(GBA(xp))− xp‖
2
2
.
(9)
In an experiment, we employ the architecture of U-Net [24]
for GAB and GBA, and the architectures of FA and FB are
the same as in [21]
TABLE I: Image classification accuracy and average structural
similarity (SSIM) values of reconstructed images by DNN-
based attacks. (N/A: not available)
Encryption
Scheme
SSIM values Accuracy (%)
UWA GA CIFAR CIFAR
[16] [17] -10 -100
Proposed Scheme N/A 0.0956 90.73 67.36
Pixel-based Same 0.1715 0.2688 91.29 67.17
[14], [15] Different 0.0425 0.1527 91.14 67.28
Tanaka’s Scheme [10] N/A 0.7152 88.96 68.13
Plain images N/A N/A 95.05 77.24
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Image classification experiments were carried out to confirm
the effectiveness of the propose scheme.
A. Dataset
We employed two image datasets: CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100, for training and evaluating the proposed scheme. The first
one is CIFAR-10 dataset which contains 32 × 32-pixel color
images and consists of 50K training images [25]. Namely,
the transformation network hp(.) was trained with CIFAR-10
dataset.
To evaluate the classification performance, we employed
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [25], which contain 32×32-pixels
color images and consists of 50K training images and 10K test
images in 10 classes and 100 classes, respectively. We utilized
CIFAR-100, to prove that the proposed scheme is applicable
to any datasets, even when the model was trained by using
CIFAR-10.
For training and testing two DNN-based attacks: UWA
[16] and GA [17], we employed STL-10 dataset [26], which
contains 96×96-pixel color images and consists of 5K training
images and 8K testing images.
B. Training Transformation Network
VGG13 [23] with batch normalization was trained by using
CIFAR-10 so that this model was considered as hθ(.). Then,
we obtained preliminary protected images (P) for training the
CycleGAN with the proposed loss function in (5).
CycleGAN was trained for 5000 epochs by using the Adam
optimizer [27] with a learning rate of 0.0002, and a momentum
parameters of β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999, where λ = 0.4, γ1 =
−1, γ2 = 0.4, and γ3 = 0.9. As a result, hp(.) was obtained
and used for generating visually-protected images. An example
of images generated by hp(.) is illustrated in Fig. 1(d), where
Fig. 1(a) is the original one.
C. Robustness against Attacks
1) Training Conditions: GA was trained for 100 epochs by
using the Adam optimizer [27] with a learning rate of 0.0002,
a momentum parameter of β = 0.5, and a batch size of 64.
For reconstructing images encrypted by Tanaka’s scheme and
the pixel-based method [14], [15], we employed the network
architectures in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), respectively. U-Net [24]
(a) Tanaka’s scheme (b) Pixel-based (Same
Key)
(c) Pixel-based (Different
Key)
(d) The proposed scheme
Fig. 7: Example of reconstructed images.
was utilized as Gatt(.) in order to reconstruct transformed
images generated by the proposed scheme.
In contrast, UWA [16] was trained for 70 epochs by using
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum for 70
epochs. The initial learning rate was set to 0.1, and was
lowered by a factor of 10 at 40 and 60 epochs. We utilized a
weight decay of 0.0005, a momentum of 0.9, and a batch size
of 128.
In all experiments, we did not carry out any data augmen-
tation and pre-processing to training images.
2) Results: Examples of reconstructed images are shown
in Fig. 7, where Fig.1(a) is the original one. Although visual
information of images encrypted by the conventional methods
was reconstructed by GA, it was difficult to reconstruct the
visual information on plain images from images encrypted by
the proposed scheme.
In addition, we measured average structural similarity
(SSIM) values between original images and reconstructed
ones, where lower values mean lower visual information. As
shown in Table I, the proposed scheme provided the lowest
SSIM values in encryption methods, namely, images generated
by the proposed scheme have higher robustness against GA
than conventional ones.
D. Image Classification
1) Training Conditions: We used deep residual networks
(ResNet) [28] without pre-trained weights for evaluating the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme in terms of image
classification accuracy.
We evaluated the performance by using ResNet with 18
layers (ResNet-18). The models with ResNet were trained by
using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum for
200 epochs. The initial learning rate was set to 0.1, and was
lowered by a factor of 5 at 60, 120, 160 epochs. We set a
weight decay and momentum to 0.0005 and 0.9.
As shown in Fig. 5(a), the models were trained with live
augmentation (random cropping with padding = 4 and random
horizontal flip). A client firstly carried out standard normaliza-
tion and data augmentation to generate pre-processed training
data (T′) from T. Eventually, the client protected T′ by using
hp(.) and then uploaded hp(T
′) to the servers to train DNN
models. As a result, the DNN models were trained by 50K
images for both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
2) Results: We compared the proposed scheme with the
pixel-based image encryption [15] in terms of classification
accuracy and robustness against COAs. As shown in Table. I,
the proposed method provided almost the same classification
accuracy as the pixel-based method. Therefore, the proposed
scheme enables us not only to maintain the classification
accuracy as that of the pixel-based method, but also to enhance
robustness against DNN-based attacks.
V. CONSLUSION
We presented a novel image transformation scheme using
generative adversarial networks (GANs) for privacy-preserving
deep neural networks (DNNs). The proposed scheme enables
us not only to apply images without visual information to
DNNs, but also to enhance robustness against ciphertext-
only attack (COAs). In this paper, the proposed scheme was
demonstrated to be able to protect visual information on
plain images, and the visually-protected images were directly
applied to DNNs for privacy-preserving image classification.
Since the proposed scheme utilizes GANs, there is no need to
manage encryption keys. In an experiment, we evaluated the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme in terms of classification
accuracy and robustness against attacks. The experimental
results confirmed that the proposed scheme enables us not
only to maintain high classification accuracy as that with the
pixel-based method, but also to enhance robustness against
DNN-based attacks.
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